Posted by: Neal Lachman | January 2, 2009

UPDATED – Nationwide FTTH: My Analysis of KPN / Reggefiber’s (now backpedalled) Plans

Introduction

More than 6.5 years ago (May 21, 2002) I sponsored the European Broadband Debate in the Library Theater Rotterdam, The Netherlands. The theater was a full-house with approximately 150 attendees; almost every self-respecting broadband professional was present. My company’s then Vice-CTO, Chris Rouse, and I also made presentations to introduce our company’s plans to connect approximately 2.5 million units in Holland to a new Fiber To The Home network. With that fact, we became the first company to set out such a bold ambition – long before KPN & Reggefiber were considering Fiber To The Home rollouts.

Over the course of 2002, I was interviewed by Emerce, NRC Handelsblad and several other media in the Netherlands. I spent the majority of 2002 talking with CEOs, CFOs and other C-level officers of Dutch and European companies. They all wanted to pick my brain; they all wanted to talk about my vision. But none of them had the “balls” to put their money where their mouth was. It was only when I had my rounds of meetings with investment bankers in New York that I started realizing that it was maybe too early for potential partners and investors to fully grasp the importance of FTTH, and the paradigm change it would bring about in the telecommunications and cable industries.

There was, of course, Kenniswijk, the €40 million project, subsidized by the Dutch government. The guys running Kenniswijk (under management of a former Cable executive, nonetheless) had absolutely no clue what they were talking about, and I feel they sabotaged my efforts to build out in the Kenniswijk region in 2002. Then again, in 2005 I met with the person in charge of Volker Wessels’ Fiber projects [Reggefiber's owner also controls VolkerWessels], Marco Westenberg, and the manager of Nuenen’s cooperative building society, Helpt Elkander. I presented these people with some initial plans, including an estimate of costs and investment strategy. It’s quite funny to see that both parties didn’t feel the need to keep me informed; instead, they did the Nuenen project without me.

I wasn’t too worried about the Dutch market anyway; I was focusing on the USA. The project we are planning for the USA is of an immense scale, which will result in 20 million FTTHome/Office connections at 1 Gbps each, and a nation-wide Fourth Generation (4G) Broadband Wireless Access network with basic speeds of 10 mbps and premium services at 100 mbps, per user – an industry first.

All the while one person from Holland had been serving on my corporate team, Vladimir Prodanovic, a pioneer in the field of FTTH. Often, during our occasional meetings whenever I’d come over to Holland, Vladimir and I would discuss the local market conditions and progress. This was basically out of general interest, because I wasn’t interested in doing anything in the Dutch market. It was always a pleasure to pick Vladimir’s brain and to spar with him on business models, the man is a world-renowned pioneer in the Fiber To The Home and Broadband Wireless Access industries.

Interested in the Dutch market again

One fine day in August (2008 ) I was working at our office (for another business) in Rotterdam, with the door open. One of the neighbors walked in and introduced himself. I told him I am an investor and that I am basically going back to the States soon to work on my FTTH and BWA project, and he told me about his profession as a Registered Valuator. Later that day, I met him in the pantry where we had a coffee. We ended up talking for an hour. He amazed me with his knowledge about the Fiber To The Home industry. He kept telling me that I should consider entering the Dutch market again. That evening I called Vladimir, and asked for his opinion and willingness to be involved. Vladimir said he would be game if I’d commit myself to the Dutch project.

I spent the following week on adjusting/updating the spreadsheets to a new Dutch scenario, and I got convinced we should go ahead with it. Our project would focus on 1.5 million FTTH/O connections in Holland, and a nation-wide 4G BWA network. Once confirmed, we told a number of players that we would get into the market again. Soon enough we started hearing moaning and sighing from the cable and telco operators. It wasn’t much surprising that KPN and Reggefiber came out with blazing guns recently, announcing a nation-wide rollout rollout of 7 million FTTH/O connections by 2015.

Background: KPN/Reggefiber Announcement

I don’t like competition (who does?!), especially not when they are big, powerful, massive companies that seem to make headway faster and better than I do. Maybe that’s why I developed a habit to painstakingly analyze and scrutinize competitors in the hope that if there is something dark or untold to be discovered, I certainly will find something to slap them around with.

Since the early 2000s, the Netherlands has had its fair share of flooding with great intentions and ambitions of politicians, businesspeople, and companies – to build Fiber To The Home, and to a lesser extent Broadband Wireless Access infrastructures. One company went beyond reasonable marketing; it had the audacity to make the boldest prediction of all. In November, 2008, the Dutch incumbent telco operator, KPN, announced that Reggefiber, a company in which it has a 41% interest, aims to connect virtually all homes and offices in The Netherlands (approximately 7 million units in total) on a new Fiber To The Home infrastructure. This was reported by a national newspaper, Trouw, on November 19th , in a screaming headline, “KPN and Reggefiber invest 6 billion [euro] in nationwide fiber- optic network.” According to the reporter, agreements for this project were to be reached in the same week. It sounded like the deal was clinched, the €6-7 billion was raised, and the shovels were going to be put in the ground one of these days.

I thought, “Woah! The Dutch incumbent has been growing some balls lately!”

Backpedalling on the Big Talk

Then, a few days later, KPN felt the need to set the record straight with an official press release,  stating that no massive rollout was being planned as of yet. They would proceed with a few pilots, which they plan to evaluate mid 2009. That must have been sobering news for a few people.

On December 19th, 2008, the Dutch mergers and acquisitions market regulator approved the KPN/Reggefiber deal. But we should not – by any means- buy into any of the KPN PR-MEDIA-PRESS warfare. KPN/Reggefiber will never be allowed to connect more than a fair percentage of the market. I’d say 25-35% (twenty-five percent) is fair. Anything beyond this level would have competitors like the cable companies and their uncles sue KPN/Reggefiber. The legal implications are many, but let me explain the most important one: KPN can and should never be allowed to use its market dominant position (which it got from its monopoly days as the state PTT) to become a next-generation monopolist, fire-spewing, multi-headed beast.

The Dutch telecom regulator, OPTA, has already put a leash on KPN/Reggefiber, demanding a maximum ceiling of revenue/fees per connection it can charge.

Analysis 101

So, first and foremost, the 7 million FTTH connections by 2015 announcement is nothing more than just that: an announcement, meant to disturb and confuse the market playing field.

Nevertheless, I was intrigued by the announcement. And I started to delve deeper into this subject matter. I approached this analysis from a perspective based on an “what if” scenario. Because you know… what if?!

One thing the FTTH industry almost always gets wrong is the average “cost per connection”.

The CPC that KPN/Reggefiber uses is highly unrealistic. The company has categorized its CPC in five levels, depending on the market.

Cost per Connection

Fee/

Charge per month

€775 – €825

€14,50

€825 – €875

€15,25

€875 – €925

€16,00

€925 – € 975

€16,75

€975 – €1025

€17,50

Source: OPTA Voorontwerp – p. 30

It is of no surprise then that the KPN/Reggefiber article mentioned that 7 million FTTH connections would cost between €6 and €7 billion. However, there is no specific outline, description or explanation how KPN/Reggefiber came up with these numbers. Of course, the company has some experience with actually rolling out and connecting homes, but not on a scale that could convince me that these numbers are based on real-life experience. In fact, these numbers seem to reflect those of Verizon’s FiOS project in the USA. However, it is becoming clearer by the day that Verizon has huge set-backs and that the CPC and Cost-Per-Home-Passed is getting more and more expensive. This is what I call the unexpected servings of the “law of large projects”.

The Law of Large Projects

I developed the “law of large projects” while working on my FiberBroadband Strategy, and established it as part of all our plannings and projections. Thus, the law of large projects has been a rule-of-thumb, a philosophy, yes – a law, within our company. In any large projects this law should be applied in order to balance the importance given to “economies of scale” and “benefits of critical mass”.

The law of large projects was needed by my company and myself as a constant reminder primarily in terms of risk-assessment and risk-management for our massive $65-70 billion project as planned for the United States. This project (which calls for 20 million FTTH/O connections and a nation-wide BWA network), would/will be the largest privately developed project in world’s history. The $65-70B investment will be spread over more than 7 years. (By the way, don’t worry: while the project will actually cost $65B, it will only require a fraction of that amount from investors, because at a certain $-point (Cash flow positive) we will have a large-enough subscriber base to fund further investments from (retained) earnings. But, I digress).

The “law of large projects” implies, among other things, the fact that while at first sight economies of scales seem to positively impact the project costs, reality may prove a disrupted, higher cost mid-way or at the end of the project – usually after reaching critical mass, which is where most project planners usually stop their projections (e.g. of operational expenditure/investments/capital expenditure). For example, in FiOS and other large-scale projects, the need (by explicit intent or because of business sense) to connect everyone and any unit on its way (all homes/offices in the region/ city/ neighborhood/ street or building) will result in a huge, unforeseen financial commitment.

Basically the law of large projects sees the dangers of any project that suddenly rolls into an unplanned upgrade or expansion; something that will always cost more money, take more time, and require more efforts. This would be manageable if only the planners would be aware of it. (After reading this now, they should be!). The problem is that planners/executives never look beyond a certain scale/level. All project planners and executives are aware of Murphy’s Law: “Whatever can go wrong will go wrong, and at the worst possible time, in the worst possible way”. But they have no idea how to prevent or anticipate Murphy’s Law. Quality Management theories (including [Lean] Six Sigma) come close, but they have more to do with the project itself than with the corporate environment.

The formula is as following:

Plan + Estimates + Economies of Scale + Critical Mass – worst-case +reality = Law of Large Projects

I have developed an algorithm that helps predict the effects of the Law of Large Project. The outcomes of the algorithm should then be included in the overall project planning and management.

The law of large projects, however, has little or no impact on small-scale projects. That is also the explanation why there may be some companies (operators and/or builders) that make money on FTTH projects, but if they exist, they are most likely small companies that serve a certain niche or a certain market.

Back to analyzing KPN/Reggefiber. 

While the KPN/Reggefiber geniuses may want their estimates to appear like they have “foreseen” any risks (e.g. by splitting the market in 5 distinct CPC categories), I believe that they have been naive and even optimistic with their estimates. In accordance with the law of large projects, it is most likely the planners haven’t looked beyond what they perceive as “the critical mass”.

I wished that the  KPN/Reggefiber CPC estimates were true; it would mean that we could make our projections based on the same assumptions. But, I believe that the actual cost per connection and operations (ongoing as the network is being built) for a nationwide rollout will end up at approximately four times the €6-7 billion they claim. It will cost approximately €25 billion, if not €35 billion. For example, our estimates call for an investment of €5-7 billion for “just” 1.5 million connections (including OpEx for the years to reach 1.5M connections).

Nationwide FTTH in The Netherlands would cost at least €25 billion 

In an oversimplified calculation, if the Dutch market consists of 7 million connections, it would thus cost approximately 4.7x what the KPN/Reggefiber geniuses estimate. That means €23.5-32B+ billion. OK, granted, in our company’s estimates we also included a nationwide Mobile/BWA infrastructure. So, take out a substantial amount, and you’re still stuck with a €20-30 billion price tag.

Now, let’s assume Reggefiber’s situation in 2015. I assume that they will have 25% of the market connected (not 100% as the “announcement” claimed), and I assume that 50% of the market will subscribe to Reggefiber’s FTTH service, and these subscribers are evenly spread in the five regions (thus 20% per region).

Cost per Connection

(range)

Fee/

Charge per month

Reggefiber # Subscribers

(total of 1.75 million)

Total

Revenue

(per month)

Based on 20%

Reg. 1. €775 – €825

€14,50

350,000

€5 M

Reg. 2 €825 – €875

€15,25

350,000

€5.3 M

Reg. 3 €875 – €925

€16,00

350,000

€5.6 M

Reg. 4 €925 – € 975

€16,75

350,000

€5.7 M

Reg. 5 €975 – €1025

€17,50

350,000

€6.1 M

€27.7M

KPN/Reggefiber’s Revenue model doesn’t add up
The annual revenue in this case would be: 12 x €27.7M = €332.4 million.
Let’s assume that the operational cost per year will be around 20% of that amount: €66.4 million.
€332.4 – €66.4 = €266 million
There are many variables that can be used on this oversimplified calculation, and there are many other costs that a business has to deal with (cost of revenue, partner fees, maintenance, replacement, investments etc.), which I did not include. Thus, if the investment to connect approximately 1.75 million units would cost approximately €7 billion (which I find more realistic), it would take KPN/Reggefiber more than 25 years before it possibly could start making money. Again, that is if it would be a lean, mean operator with very low other costs.
If KPN/Reggefiber has some financial engineering power, they may find a way to lower their capital requirement (from investors and third party funds) to approximately half of the full project cost, thus €3.5 billion. But who will pay this? How can KPN/reggefiber afford this?
The true Raison d’être for KPN/Reggefiber in FTTH 
Investors will never want to step into such a project. Once they will study the business plan, they will soon see the financing/business flaws in the entire project, its projections, estimates and assumptions. However, I doubt investors will ever see a business plan. KPN/Reggefiber will most likely end up with a huge debt load – most likely to the extent of 100% of the project. They know they won’t make money with Fiber To The Home for the first 2-3 decades! Why do they want to build it then? Well, let me explain to you the true bottom-line of KPN/Reggefiber’s project.
KPN has a new lease on life since a few years; it had a near-death experience in 2001. However, with the advent of 3G (and now 4G) competition and FTTH in their main market, KPN knows that anno 2009 there is only one way for them and the entire telecom industry: down. Thus, it jumped on the FTTH bandwagon, something it recently decided.
I remember attending a presentation by KPN in 2002 in The Hague where they were still talking about plans to milks xDSL for the coming 2 decades. Nowadays they know FTTH will be the main part of the telecom pie, and thus they choose to be part of this industry, even if it means cannibalizing their own income and eventually transferring/migrating their customers to the FTTH industry. In fact, KPN may be grooming itself in the Netherlands to become a service provider rather than a core-infrastructure owner.
Reggefiber is controlled by Dik Wessels, a man who knows lots about the value of infrastructures. Mr. Wessels controls an infrastructure company, Volker Stevin, and guess who is (and will be) building out the expensive FTTH network? Yes, you guessed right. There is a whole division, called VolkerStevin Telecom that’s doing the infrastructure work.
Low “per-connection valuation”
KPN is believed to have paid €100 million for its 41% stake in Reggefiber, valuing the company at approximately €220 million. Based on Reggefiber’s information  there were 150,000 units installed and connected by Reggefiber, this would translate in a value of €1.400,- per connection, which is very cheap and below industry-average prices. The reason for this low valuation is yet another signal that there is much more going on between KPN/Reggefiber than meets the eye.  This KPN/Reggefiber strategy is not conventional business where an investor makes a great return on his/her investment. It is about them staying in business.
—————————
UPDATE: January 15, 2009
Respected Telecom Expert, Hendrik Rood, commented on this analysis (see the 5th comment), which inspired me to do a further breakdown. I have copied his comment and answered it per subject.
————————–

Hendrik,

I asked you for numbers, but then decided not to ask you to waste your time, so I did it myself. I also broke down your post per subject.

HR:

The monthly lease pricing in the proposal is linked to the investment per passive connection. There is an explicit mentioning in the OPTA-piece that when investment per connection rises above the highest current category, additional categories with higher per month charges for more expensive areas will be added.

NSL:

You may be right. I apologize for not checking back on the document, but what I did is I went to my sheet and accommodated the additional categories in my model. So much so, that I doubled the categories/regions to ten.

1)      I assumed the same €50 increase per category

2)      I asummed the same €0.75 increase per connection per category

3)      I assumed the same 1.75 million connections, this time divided by ten (thus 175,000 per category)

This is what I came up with:

Cost per Connection

(range)

Fee/

Charge per month

Reggefiber # Subscribers

(total of 1.75 million)

Total

Revenue

(per month)

Based on 10%

Reg. 1. €775 – €825

€14,50

175,000

€2,5M

Reg. 2 €825 – €875

€15,25

175,000

€2,7M

Reg. 3 €875 – €925

€16,00

175,000

€2.8 M

Reg. 4 €925 – € 975

€16,75

175,000

€2.9 M

Reg. 5 €975 – €1025

€17,50

175,000

€3.0 M

Reg. 6 €1025 – €1075

€18,25

175,000

€3.2M

Reg.7 €1075 -€1125

€19,00

175,000

€3.3M

Reg.8 €1125 – €1175

€19,75

175,000

€3.5M

Reg.9 €1175 – €1225

€20,50

175,000

€3.5M

Reg.10 €1225- €1275

€21,25

175,000

€3.7M

Total

1,750,000

€31.3

Thus, KPN/Reggefiber’s grand scheme would be improved by €3.6M (three million and six hundred thousand euro).

I think this further supports my claim that it is not feasible.

HR:

It is therefore not correct to multiply the price with a factor 4 and then declare that the Reggefiber/KPN model does not add up.

NSL:

The factor 4 increase was just a ballpark figure. It could be factor 5 maybe? Why should it be less?

HR:

If that high investment per connection will be the ultimate case, due to your law of large projects, higher monthly lease rates will be charged and any regulator will go along with that for the additional projects. Regulators are in a learning curve too.

NSL:

My Law of Projects answers my own question I just asked: “Why should it cost less than factor 4?”. We all have learned from Murphy’s Law. Projects, especially large ones, will most probably go over budget. Thus, when the median factor is 4, due to the law of Large Projects’ ascription to the fact that things will always be more expensive and more of a hassle, a factor of 5 is more reasonable than a factor 3.

In any case, as per your wishes, I have included the additional benefit per NEW category, based on  KPN/Reggefiber’s own increase-model. And still, the net value created/added is negligible.

HR:

A regulator will go along, as in that case of higher investmen per connection it is practical deployment, not the outcome of a theoretical calculation in some fancy business plan, that then proves that Reggefiber/KPN underestimated their investment costs.

NSL:

Regulator’s point well taken, agreed and understood.

Regarding my fancy businessplan, I must say that this was just a simple analysis I could have pulled out of my arse – it was so simple to do. Please, excuse my French! ;) Even then, I gave you new fodder.

HR:

Without actual deployment of FTTH at any substantive scale in a western economy ( note I discern FTTH from FTTBuilding) nobody knows the outcome, yet ….

NSL:

I fully agree with you.

HR:

The proof of the pudding is in the eating.

NSL:

How many flavors do you want?

NOTE: Updated November 10, 2011 to reflect the actual numbers and rollout dates concerning/as per iUHBA Networks most current plans. (iUHBA has assumed all ownership of Gigaspeed).

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Responses

  1. [...] unknown wrote an interesting post today onNationwide FTTH: My Analysis of KPN / Reggefiberâ??s (now …Here’s a quick excerptWhile the KPN/Reggefiber geniuses may want their estimates to appear like they have “foreseen” any risks (e.g. by splitting the market in 5 distinct CPC categories), I believe that they have been naive and even optimistic with their … [...]

  2. However you sound very aggrieved that all these people over the years have not accepted your views and got accredited, I agree to most of it.

    KPN has build a reputation for spreading FUD, making overly pretentious plans, and then stranding after the pilot – breaching investment contracts. (like in the FTTC/ All-IP plans).

    I think the initiative of Dick Wessels to build a “second network” of fibre has caused fear in such intensity that they felt forced to take a share.

    The Business models vary much with to what extend the “network” is calculated: – including equipment? All homes connected (or just passed)? including service feed (backhaul etc)?

    thank you for the blog – good point made.

    last question; now will Lachmann also invest?
    if so – what investment horizon do you have in years?

  3. Hi Jan,

    I may sound a bit bitter, yeah! ;) But, contrary to popular belief, I am not easily bittered.

    These bitter episodes in life are part of a learning curve. I have come to terms with taking things as they come, and when they come, I take them with a few pinches of salt. I have had two personal bankruptcies that shaped my character, but while I bend, I never break.

    What surprised me (everywhere in the world) was the hunger of people to compete with me for the title of “FTTH visionary”, something I never cared for. Then, when I realized this was really a major (underbelly-feeling-kinda) issue, I started putting the word “vision” and “pioneering” in more of my speeches and posts – just to piss these same people off!

    Now, coming to your points:

    1) I have received emails and kudos from Dutch telecom experts about this post, which made me smile and feel that it was worthwile. Most agree that KPN is playing delay/detract/disrupt/disarm tactics with their campaigns. Most telco experts know that KPN is shooting blanks.

    2) Dik Wessels bought the infrastructure division from KPN in the early 2000s – these guys have been playing cahoots ever since. I believe that there was NO real competition, ever; it was a smoke-screen.

    3) Their “announcement” called for the entire nation to be connected, not passed. They mentioned 7 million connections, not “market of 7 million”. My assumptions are based on the info available.

    4) Lachman & Co. will invest heavily in NL. We are starting with a small fund (€2.5 million, soon to be released) by my family and friends, followed by a large funding from third parties over the course of 1.5 years, starting after the summer 2009.

    Ultimately, this major infrastructures project will result in approximately 1.5 million FTTHome/Office connections (total market is 7 million connections) and 4 million wireless subscribers (total market is approximately 17-20 million) in the Netherlands.

    This €5 billion project will cost our investors “just” €250 million; a fraction of the value and tangible assets created. This low amount funding requirement is the result of years of fine-tuning all aspects of the project development plans and the rollout strategy – as part of the FiberBroadband Strategy; at the break-even-point of approx. €250 million, the company’s subscriber base generate enough income (the cash-flow positive state) to pay for the project’s investments and other expenses from Retained Earnings. This €250M funding will be provided by a pool of third-party (institutional/corporate/individual/strategic) investors.

    5) Prior to the “major” fundraising, we are starting a Family & Friend fund. This, because over the course of the last years we came across people (family, friends, business associates, angels, VCs) looking for an investment opportunity. With the recent official Value Potential Report (December 2008 by a Specialist Registered Valuators & Corporate Finance firm) and market analysis, we feel confident enough to involve family and friends in the seed financing, with which we will finance a pilot for 250 users in a Dutch city, build the foundations of a new nation-wide mobile network (competing with KPN/Vodafone/T-mobile), file several patents, and make road show presentations to large investors for the next round of funding.

    At the end, it seems like Lachman & Friends will be the last one standing and laughing.

  4. For those who have seen the initial few comments here, the matter with Mr. HT is resolved. Therefore I have deleted the comment/reproductions that I put here previously.

  5. [...] where the project is smaller but still big for Dutch standards. Our Dutch FTTH and BWA project will cost almost €5 billion over a period of 6 years. (The BEP is at €250). Almost half (€2.5 billion), of this investment [...]

  6. There is a slight flaw in the exposé.

    The monthly lease pricing in the proposal is linked to the investment per passive connection. There is an explicit mentioning in the OPTA-piece that when investment per connection rises above the highest current category, additional categories with higher per month charges for more expensive areas will be added.

    It is therefore not correct to multiply the price with a factor 4 and then declare that the Reggefiber/KPN model does not add up.

    If that high investment per connection will be the ultimate case, due to your law of large projects, higher monthly lease rates will be charged and any regulator will go along with that for the additional projects. Regulators are in a learning curve too.

    A regulator will go along, as in that case of higher investmen per connection it is practical deployment, not the outcome of a theoretical calculation in some fancy business plan, that then proves that Reggefiber/KPN underestimated their investment costs.

    Without actual deployment of FTTH at any substantive scale in a western economy ( note I discern FTTH from FTTBuilding) nobody knows the outcome, yet ….

    The proof of the pudding is in the eating.

  7. Hendrik,

    Thanks for your feedback. I am still of the opinion that a nationwide project will not be feasible for many reasons, including the financing difficulties/capital intensity.

    I think you are mixing up at least 2 or 3 facts. Also, I have made assumptions because there are no exact scenarios known; it is everyone’s prerogative to disagree. However, nothing convinces me more than numbers. If your hypothesis is more correct than mine, you can easily show it with numbers. Unless I see convincing numbers, based on reasonable assumptions, maybe with two variables, I stand by my analysis.

    Take care.

    Neal

  8. Neal,

    What kind of numbers are you looking for?
    Actual bills that construction companies have sent to roll out these passive fibre networks and built local huts to house the ODFs?

    What makes you think that the cost of fiber outside plants are still grossly underestimated, after companies constructing them have seen the bills and outlay for an ensemble of villages, towns, suburbs and dense cities for multiple years?

    As soon as you do the math, assuming they have put in the correct figures and there is not a 4-fold rise in cost, the numbers do add up.

    Depending on penetration levels the ROI varies from 5 years (100% actual take up), to 10 years (50%) to 20 years (25%).

    A cable company or a telephone company

  9. can decide themselves whether they do a cutover and decommission the old plant and thus steer penetration levels.

  10. Hendrik,

    I appreciate your comments, but I think this is leading to nowhere. I think this is becoming a circular discussion.

    Thanks for your input tho.

    Neal


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